According to Suvorov, Stalin – not Hitler – ranks as “the chief culprit” behind the outbreak of World War II in Europe.
“The ‘Suvorov Hypothesis’ claimed that during the summer of 1941 Stalin was on the very verge of mounting a massive invasion and conquest of Europe, while Hitler’s sudden attack on June 22nd of that year was intended to forestall that looming blow. Moreover, the author also argued that Stalin’s planned attack constituted merely the final act in a much longer geopolitical strategy that he had been developing since at least the early 1930s.”
If this theory is correct – and it must be said, it is a controversial one, and one which (as this article points out) scholars in the English-speaking world have been reluctant to touch with the proverbial ten-foot pole – but if, I say, if this theory is correct, it means that the other Allies (Britain and France, initially, and then later Britain and America) were the unwitting dupes of Stalin, and participated in – even enabled – his plan to bring Europe under Communist domination.
A plan which darned near succeeded, in the aftermath of WW II!
If it is accurate, however, it’s not hard to see why English-speaking scholars are reluctant to even address it, much less approve it: it would, first, put a more sympathetic spin on the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. And second, as mentioned above, it would reveal the victorious Allies – supposedly the moral “good guys” in a war against evil – as having been, to reiterate, unwitting dupes in Stalin’s war of conquest against Europe in the name of world-wide Communist hegemony.
Or, worse yet, open the possibility that they may not have been unwitting dupes. There’s a thought to make one’s blood run cold!
The author goes on to write,
“Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the new Soviet regime had been viewed with extreme suspicion and hostility by other European countries, most of which also regarded their own domestic Communist Parties as likely fifth columns. So to fulfill Lenin’s dream and carry the revolution to Germany and the rest of Europe, Stalin somehow needed to split the Europeans, and break their common line of resistance.
“He allegedly viewed Hitler’s rise as exactly such a potential ‘icebreaker,’ an opportunity to unleash another bloody European war and exhaust all sides, while the Soviet Union remained aloof and bided its strength, waiting for the right moment to sweep in and conquer the entire continent.”
And so they almost did, if Suvorov is correct. I will not here recount the remarkable Soviet build-up, and that almost totally of offensive troops and armaments, recounted in this article; I encourage you to read it for yourselves. But, the article points out, at
“almost the last moment, Hitler suddenly realized the strategic trap into which he had fallen, and ordered his heavily outnumbered and outgunned troops into a desperate surprise attack of their own on the assembling Soviets, fortuitously catching them at the very point at which their own final preparations for sudden attack had left them most vulnerable, and thereby snatching a major initial victory from the jaws of certain defeat…
“The enormous and fully-militarized resources of the Soviet state, supplemented by the contributions of Britain and America, did eventually turn the tide of battle and lead to a Soviet victory, but Stalin ended up with only half of Europe rather than its entirety.”
Again, this is a controversial theory; but so have been many, which have later been proven to be correct. But if it is accurate, it is chilling in its implications. Not only because it would force us to confront the sobering and counter-intuitive possibility that we have Hitler to thank (!) for all of Europe not falling under Soviet domination, but also for what it may suggest in terms of the Western Allies’ delusion – or worse yet, possible complicity – in the face of Stalin’s plans.
I am not, as a rule, a fan of revisionist history, and particularly not when it is being undertaken in support of sociopolitical agendas, as happens too often in these times we live in. But that does not mean we should blind ourselves to new or under-reported evidence, when it does exist. And this is particularly the case when it does not, as Suvorov’s hypothesis appears not to, have a present-day political agenda behind it.
Whether or not this controversial theory will eventually be vindicated by “mainstream” historians remains to be seen. Certainly not while the mainstream academy is in the grip of Leftists and cultural Marxists, for whom Stalin is more hero than culprit! In this, I am reminded of Peter Hitchens’ more critical approach to the role of Great Britain in that same War – which is also ignored, when not being excoriated, by mainstream historians. But Suvorov’s take on the situation is certainly suggestive, well-documented, and a reminder that there are usually two (or more!) sides to any story.
[N.B. – The revised, English-language version of Suvorov’s book, The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II, was published in 2008 by the Naval Institute Press in Annapolis, which serves as a fair indication that it should be taken seriously as a work of history. Not some fly-by-night independent publishing house, with an axe to grind!]